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CIVIL RIGHTS - SHADES OF RACE: AN HISTORICALLY IN­
FORMED READING OF TITLE VII 
INTRODUCTION 
This Note will argue that current 'reverse discrimination' juris­
prudence under Title VII is fundamentally flawed, and that it is 
flawed because jurists have lost sight of the originating purposes of 
Title VII as part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.1 The Note begins in 
Part I with an exegesis of a recent case, Tappe v. Alliance Capital 
Management,z in order to examine the theme that all persons, of 
whatever race, must receive the same prima facie analysis under the 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene3 employment discrimination 
test. Part II will explore the word 'discrimination' within the con­
text of this nation's long history of white oppression of blacks; next, 
Part III will discuss the history surrounding the adoption of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act. This history will go beyond the standard 
'legislative history,' although it will address that as well, to look to 
the larger social and cultural events at the time to determine what 
wrongs the Act was designed to remedy. Part IV presents employ­
ment statistics showing what effects Title VII has had over time in 
opening up employment to African Americans on an equal basis 
with their white counterparts. Parts V, VI and VII will examine the 
way the Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning and purpose 
of Title VII in the context of affirmative action. Part VIII will view 
and critique the arguments of those opposed to allowing Title VII 
to recognize race as a legitimate criteria, in certain circumstances, 
for making employment decisions. Finally, Part IX will argue that 
the purposes of Title VII and the 1964 Civil Rights Act are frus­
trated by the jurisprudence of cases like Tappe. This Note con­
cludes that a reasonable and just reading of the statute requires that 
jurists recognize the larger objectives of the Act when they are de­
ciding how to analyze reverse discrimination cases. 
I. TAPPE V. ALLIANCE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
In 2000, Wayne Tappe, a white male, brought suit against his 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). 
2. 177 F. Supp. 2d 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
3. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
387 
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employer, Alliance Capital Management, alleging, among other 
things, that his employer had violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act by discriminating against him because of his race.4 Alli­
ance had fired Tappe, a portfolio manager in the firm's High Yield 
group, on December 8, 1999, the day he was to receive his yearly 
bonus.s At the time, Tappe was thirty-eight years 01d.6 There were 
four other portfolio managers in the group, none of whom were 
fired; three of those managers were women, one of the women, 
black.7 The fourth manager was a fifty-five year old white male.s 
When Tappe asked why he was fired, his superior, Wayne Lyski, 
told him only that he "did not fit with the profile of the High Yield 
Group and its strategy going forward."9 
Tappe filed a complaint against Alliance alleging numerous 
causes, including that he was discriminated against because of his 
race and sex in violation of Title VII. In his complaint, Tappe al­
leged that he was singled out to be fired because each of the other 
managers was "a member of a protected class by virtue of his or her 
gender, race and/or age."l0 The only evidence produced by Tappe 
in support of this allegation was the statement by Lyski that Tappe 
did not "fit with the profile of the High Yield Group."ll In re­
sponse to his allegations, Alliance filed a motion to dismiss Tappe's 
suit for failure to raise a claim for which a court might grant relief.12 
In analyzing Tappe's claims to determine if they would survive 
the defense's motion to dismiss, the court used the McDonnell 
Douglas "burden shifting framework" established by the Supreme 
Court in 1973.13 This four-part test allows a plaintiff to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) he is 
within a protected group, (2) he is qualified for the position, (3) he 
was subject to an adverse employment action, (4) and the adverse 
action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination based on membership in the protected group.14 






10. Id. (citing N.Y.C. Admin. Code Section 8-1D7(a)). The age claim stems from 
the New York City Human Rights statute. Id. 
11. Id. at 180. 
12. !d. at 179. 
13. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
14. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 180. The original test from McDonnell Douglas 
read: 
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If Tappe failed to meet anyone prong of this test, his claims of 
discrimination would be dismissed. If Tappe could meet the test, 
then "a presumption of discrimination [would be] created and the 
burden of production [would] shift[ ] to the defendant to articulate 
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employ­
ment action or terrnination."15 In its motion, Alliance argued that 
Tappe could not meet the first and fourth prongs of the McDonnell 
Douglas test.16 Although at first blush it would seem clear that 
Tappe would never be able to meet the first or fourth prongs of the 
McDonnell Douglas test because he is a white male, the court in 
fact found that Tappe was a member of a protected class and so did 
meet the first prong of the test.17 
It is worthwhile reviewing the court's reasoning on this issue, 
because it lays out a new and apparently unprecedented argument 
in favor of allowing "majority" plaintiffs like Tappe to be protected 
in precisely the same way as minority plaintiffs under the McDon­
nell Douglas test for a presumptive violation of Title VII. The first 
question for the court was "whether a plaintiff in a 'reverse discrim­
ination' lawsuit must allege special circumstances to qualify as a 
member of a protected group ...."18 The court in Tappe pointed 
out that the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans­
portation CO.19 had said that Title VII "does not distinguish be­
tween traditional and non-traditional plaintiffs."20 And as the court 
in Tappe noted, McDonald had held that what was prohibited by 
Title VII was "discriminatory preference for any [racial] group, mi­
nority or majority."21 The Tappe court also noted that the McDon­
ald Court had found its reverse discrimination case 
"indistinguishable from McDonnell Douglas" in holding that the 
court must use the same standard to judge "members of all races," 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified 
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant's qualifications. 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
15. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (citing Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 
91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001». 
16. [d. at 181. 
17. [d. at 182. 
18. [d. at 181 (citing Iadimarco v. Runyan, 190 F.3d 151, 160 (3rd Cir. 1999)). 
19. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
20. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 181. 
21. [d. (quoting McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279) (emphasis omitted). 
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when deciding whether to dismiss their cases.22 
The Tappe court said that requiring Tappe to meet a standard 
different than that required by minority plaintiffs, like the com­
monly applied "background circumstances" test,23 would subject 
him to a "higher burden" than a minority plaintiff in a like situ a­
tion.24 To place similarly situated plaintiffs on different footing 
would then subject the court's decision to "heightened constitu­
tional scrutiny."25 This finding would be unacceptable because 
"courts ... must provide equal protection of the laws."26 While not 
all racial distinctions are unconstitutional, any such distinctions 
"raise serious constitutional issues and must first survive a height­
ened equal protection scrutiny."27 The court quoted the Supreme 
Court's ruling in INS v. St. Cyr28 to the effect that an interpretation 
which avoids serious constitutional problems is the best choice if 
the statute can be fairly read to avoid such problems.29 Because the 
court in Tappe found that giving all plaintiffs the right to the same 
standard of pleading is "fairly possible," all plaintiffs must have the 
same pleading standard-a result which the court said follows from 
"Title VII's plain language as well as the precedent of the Supreme 
Court and this Circuit."30 Therefore, said the court, Tappe meets 
the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.3! 
The fourth prong, however, Tappe was not able to fulfill, at 
least not upon the facts alleged: first, that he had been terminated 
because "he did not fit with the profile of the High Yield group" 
and second, that every other member of the High Yield group was a 
member of a protected group "by virtue of his or her gender, race 
and/or age."32 These facts were not enough, according to the court, 
22. [d. at 181-82. In addition, the Tappe court cited a recent Supreme Court deci­
sion which held that sex discrimination is also illegal when perpetrated against men as 
well as women. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998». 
23. See Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). In Parker, the court found that majority plaintiffs could establish a McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie test if they could show that the "background circumstances [of the 
case] support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discrimi­
nates against the majority." Id. 
24. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 182. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 183 (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Adarand v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200 (1995». 
28. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
29. Tappe, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 183. 
30. Id. 
31. [d. 
32. Id. at 184. 
391 2004] SHADES OF RACE 
to establish the fourth prong because if they were enough that 
"would mean that employees would always have a prima facie case 
of employment discrimination whenever they lost their jobs. "33 
Tappe's claims were dismissed because he had "failed to allege 
that he was terminated 'under circumstances giving rise to an infer­
ence of discrimination."'34 He was, however, given leave to amend, 
which he promptly did. Tappe's second complaint35 [hereinafter 
Tappe II] was sufficient to survive defendant's 12(b )(6) motion.36 
In his amended complaint, Tappe made two additional allegations 
which the court held would raise an inference of discrimination. 
First, Tappe claimed that he "performed his job better than anyone 
in the group."37 According to the court, this fact alone would have 
been enough to support his allegation of discrimination because 
"while employers who impermissibly rely on a protected character­
istic may fire their best employee (and him alone), employers moti­
vated by profit or other legitimate reasons do not."38 Tappe's 
second addition was a claim that he had been fired because Alli­
ance was afraid that one of the other members of the group would 
bring suit for discrimination if they were fired.39 The court said that 
this too would, by itself, "qualify as unlawful discrimination" be­
cause while the "typical Title VII case or claim involves impermissi­
ble animus or stereotyping," Title VII is violated whenever an 
employee is treated "differently 'because of' the person's race, sex, 
or other protected characteristic."40 
Thus, Wayne Tappe survived dismissal on the pleadings and 
will have his day in court. On one level, the question this Note will 
pursue is a simple one: Has Wayne Tappe been discriminated 
against in a way that Title VII ought to recognize? Or is the result 
in some way a perversion of the intent of Title VII, a trivialization 
of the great purpose of the 1964 Civil Rights Act? Would the draft­
ers of Title VII have wanted the law they crafted to be used in this 
way? 
Of course, asking the question in this way implies its own an­
swer. There are, however, deeper issues involved. The result in 
33. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
34. Id. at 185 (quoting Farias v. Instructional Sys. Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 98 (2001)). 
35. Tappe v. Alliance Capital Mgmt., 198 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) [here­
inafter Tappe II]. 
36. Id. at 370 (denying defendant's motion). 
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Tappe reflects a deep divide within American society; it is part of 
the larger argument over affirmative action that once again recently 
found itself before the Supreme Court.41 In fact, the Tappe deci­
sion is directly traceable to the argument over affirmative action 
that has taken place within the Supreme Court itself over the last 
thirty years. In 1976 the Supreme Court saw its first 'reverse dis­
crimination' case under Title VII,42 and decided that Title VII's 
"terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any 
particular race."43 Then in 1979, the Court decided United Steel­
workers of America v. Weber,44 which said that Title VII did not 
prohibit affirmative action in the private workplace.45 At that mo­
ment a conflict was born: how can we reconcile the view that Title 
VII must protect all persons equally with the notion that one may 
engage in private affirmative action, i.e., that we may treat some 
persons differently than others? This Note will argue that this con­
flict can be reconciled by recognizing that, while Title VII protects 
persons of all races, it need not protect all persons equally and that 
to hold that Title VII must protect all persons under precisely equal 
standards undermines Congress' purpose in passing Title VII in the 
first place. 
II. WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION? A BRIEF REMINDER OF THE 

HISTORY OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN AMERICA 

Not all forms of discrimination are the same. Racial discrimi­
nation has long been recognized by the Supreme Court to be a 
more invidious form of discrimination than discrimination against 
women,46 which in turn the Court sees as more troubling than dis­
41. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
42. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
43. [d. at 278-79. 
44. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
45. /d. at 208 ("We therefore hold that Title VII's prohibition in §§ 703(a) and (d) 
against racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious 
affirmative action plans. "). 
46. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]lllegal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect [and] ... 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."). Discrimination based on sex is 
reviewed under a less rigid "intermediate scrutiny," which is described by Justice Scalia 
in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,572 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that 
there must be some "important governmental objective" to justify the discrimination 
and the "discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement 
of those [the government's] objectives."). 
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crimination based on disability.47 Until only fifteen years ago, the 
Court recognized a difference between government action designed 
to oppress minorities and government action intended to remedy 
the effects of past unlawful discrimination.48 Thus, not all forms of 
discrimination are necessarily equal in the eyes of the law. This is 
why it makes sense to ask whether all forms of racial discrimination 
under Title VII are equivalent, and whether they ought to be 
treated the same under law. 
As every student of American history knows, the "brunt of the 
burden of racial discrimination" in this country has been borne by 
African Americans.49 But to say that African Americans have 
borne the brunt of racial discrimination in America is to minimize 
and dismiss the enormity of the racial oppression inflicted on blacks 
in this nation. First brought over as slaves, deprived of home, fam­
ily and identity, black Americans spent two hundred and forty-four 
years50 being worked as one would work oxen. They were, in the 
eyes of the law, mere chattel, property to be owned by any white 
man with enough money to buy. After the· Constitution was 
adopted, the status of blacks changed slightly: officially recognized 
at last,51 albeit not explicitly, they were now something slightly 
more than property, and something significantly less than persons. 
They were three-fifths persons, and their numbers as such were 
used simply to empower those who enslaved them.52 Then came 
Emancipation, and after the failure of Reconstruction-a failure 
brought about by the angry resistance of white men and the politi­
cal compromises53 of the powerful-followed another century or so 
47. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 357 (2001) (holding that the disabled 
are entitled to only the most lenient "rational basis" scrutiny). 
48. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) ("Today, for the first time, a majority of this Court has adopted strict scru­
tiny as its standard of Equal Protection Clause review of race-conscious remedial 
measures. "). 
49. See 110 CONGo REC. H1599 (1964) (comment of Rep. Minish during debate 
over passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) ("It is plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered discrimination 
immeasurably greater than any directed at other racial groups."). 
50. The first ship bringing black slaves to the Colonies arrived in Jamestown, Vir­
ginia, in 1619. Robert D. Loevy, Introduction to THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964: THE 
PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 1 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 
1997). Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Id. 
at 3. 
51. Jefferson's original condemnation of slavery was deleted from the Declara­
tion of Independence so as not to lose southern support for the Revolution. Id. at 2. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 3-4. The author discusses the compromise of 1876 when, in exchange 
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of legalized segregation54 and oppression.55 Once again, blacks 
were 'free' only to the extent that whites allowed them to be free. 
It was in this period, the period of Jim Crow, that white racism 
was most perfidious and least excusable-where African Ameri­
cans, now nominally free, were forced to abide a systematic, humili­
ating, and deadly56 imposition of racial subjugation by both their 
fellow private citizens and by the government ostensibly formed to 
uphold the rights of man. 57 
The Supreme Court of the United States was itself the catalyst 
for the spread and entrenchment of Jim Crow. In the Civil Rights 
Cases, the Court said that the 14th Amendment did not extend to 
the acts of private citizens.58 The result of the decision was to allow 
private individuals to "not only discriminate against blacks but ... 
actually terrorize them, confident in the knowledge that the power 
of the United States Government ... would not be used to punish 
them."59 So long as the States themselves did not discriminate, the 
for an agreement that Rutherford B. Hayes would be determined the winner of the 
disputed election of 1876, Republicans agreed to remove all Union troops from the 
South. Thus, Reconstruction came to an end. [d. 
54. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Loevy, supra note 50, at 8 
("The end result of the Civil Rights Cases ... was to give white individuals almost 
complete license, including lynching and murder, to personally enforce racial segrega­
tion, all of it done without any sense that there would ever be any official punish­
ment."). See also 110 CONGo REC. H1541 (1964) (statement of Rep. Lindsay: "There 
are instances where the coercive arm of the State has been applied to encourage or to 
support policies of commercial segregation. . .. They have intimidated, coerced, and 
arrested those engaged in peaceful picketing to obtain equal rights ...."). 
55. Loevy, supra note 50, at 8 ("[M]urders and assassinations remained an ever­
present personal technique for frightening southern blacks into submission to white 
supremacy."). 
56. See PHILIP PERLMUTTER, DIVIDED WE FALL: A HISTORY OF ETHNIC, RELIG· 
IOUS, AND RACIAL PREJUDICE IN AMERICA 151 (1992). The emergence of the Ku Klux 
Klan and other secret societies after the Civil War led to widespread violence against 
African Americans: 
Blacks were subjected to floggings, house burnings, mutilations, shootings, 
stabbings, and hangings. In Louisiana, in 1868, 2,000 were killed or wounded 
in just a few weeks; in Florida, in a single county, more than 150 were mur­
dered in a few months; and in Texas, murders became "so common as to 
render it impossible to keep accurate accounts of them." 
/d. 
57. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ( "[T]hat all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. - That to 
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed ...."). 
58. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("Individual invasion of indi­
vidual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment."). 
59. Loevy, supra note 50, at 7. See also MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW 
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14th Amendment provided no protection for blacks from the ra­
cism of whites. Thus, "[b]y the early 1890's a black was lynched in 
the South an average of every three days. "60 Whites made up the 
juries, and white police officers, "committed ... to the doctrine of 
white supremacy," were free to suppress their black neighbors 
through violence, confident that no one would do anything to stop 
or punish them.61 
Plessy v. Ferguson became the law of the land in 1896 and seg­
regation blossomed throughout the South.62 Although segregation 
had long been the norm,63 it now had been challenged in court and 
had withstood the challenge. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, laws banning interracial marriage and mandating separate 
facilities had appeared in almost every possible incarnation.64 There 
were the infamous separate drinking fountains and bathrooms,65 
but there were also laws mandating "segregated schools, trains, 
streetcars, hotels, barbershops, restaurants, and theaters. "66 Blacks 
had different hospitals and mental hospitals, different prisons, dif­
ferent homes for the disabled.67 "In New Orleans, prostitutes were 
separated by race."68 In Atlanta courts, black witnesses were not 
allowed to swear on the same Bible as white witnesses.69 Even in 
AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST­
BROWN SOUTH 11-17 (1987) (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to enforce the Ku 
Klux Klan Act). 
60. Loevy, supra note 50, at 7. See also RICHARD WORMSER, THE RISE AND 
FALL OF JIM CROW 74 (2003) (Lynchings increased from 113 a year in 1891 to 134 in 
1894. "Until 1905, more than one hundred men and women were lynched every year 
but one."). 
61. Loevy, supra note 50, at 8 ("Another part of the system of black oppression 
was 'the free white jury that will never convict."'). See also BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 
25 (In May of 1947, a jury in Greenville, South Carolina acquitted thirty-one white men 
of having lynched a black man, "despite the fact that the FBI had obtained confessions 
from twenty-six of the defendants."). 
62. See supra notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text. 
63. See PERLMUTTER, supra note 56, at 151 (Soon after the end of the Civil War, 
"'Black Codes' multiplied denying Blacks the right to own weapons, serve on juries, 
purchase or lease property, be idle, or behave disrespectfully toward Whites."). 
64. ALDON MORRIS, CENTURlES OF BLACK PROTEST: ITs SIGNIFICANCE FOR 
AMERICA AND THE WORLD, RACE IN AMERICA, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 41 
(Hebert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993). In fact, interracial marriages had been 
outlawed in at least seven of the original thirteen colonies as early as 1662. See PERL­
MUTTER, supra note 56, at 74. 
65. WORMSER, supra note 60, at 105. 
66. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 41. 
67. WORMSER, supra note 60, at 105. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
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death, blacks and white were interred in separate cemeteriesJo 
Significantly, Jim Crow served to push African Americans into 
separate and unequal portions of the labor market.71 Black work­
ers were restricted in the occupations they could undertake, gener­
ally being forced into low wage manual labor and prevented from 
joining skilled crafts and trades by the discrimination of labor un­
ions.72 The only option left to many blacks was that of sharecrop­
ping, exchanging their labor for a portion of a landlord's cropsJ3 
This exclusion from skilled trades actually caused the numbers of 
skilled African-American workers in the South to decline by almost 
90% in the post-Civil War eraJ4 
Jim Crow was a pervasive system that was initiated and de­
signed to ensure white domination in American societyJ5 Under 
Jim Crow, black Americans were prevented from exercising their 
votes in numerous ways, including poll taxes, literacy tests, and 
property requirementsJ6 When these quasi-legal barriers failed to 
work, whites resorted to the "central weapon ... in the struggle for 
white domination," violence.77 It is difficult to overstate the level 
of violence that whites, particularly in the South, were willing to 
unleash on blacks who insisted on attempting to vote, organize, im­
prove their lot, and gain equality. The Ku Klux Klan "beat, 
whipped and murdered thousands, and terrorized tens of thousands 
to prevent them from voting. "78 The violence was widespread and 
systernic;79 and, when not actually engaging in the violence them­
selves,80 white police did little or nothing to stop the violence'.81 
70. Id, It is important to note that while segregation reached its pinnacle in the 
South, it began in the North even before slavery had been abolished. PERLMUlTER, 
supra note 56, at 142. 
71. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 41-42. 
72. Id. 
73. WORMSER, supra note 60, at 36. 
74. PERLMUlTER, supra note 56, at 173 ("[I]n the South at the close of the Civil 
War, 100,000 out of 125,000 artisans and craftsmen were Black, but by 1900 the number 
had decreased to less than 10,000. "). 
75. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 41. See also BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 7 ("In 
1907 Mississippi's Senator James K. Vardaman declared that every Negro in the state 
would be lynched if such a slaughter were necessary to maintain white supremacy."). 
76. BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 7. 
77. Id. 
78. WORMSER, supra note 60, at 24. 
79. See, e.g., id. at 24-25, 30-31, 74, 84-87, 126-28, 130, and 168-69. 
80. BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 9 ("Indeed, according to Arthur F. Raper, during 
the period 1930-1933, sheriffs or their deputies planned or participated in nearly half of 
all lynchings. "). 
81. Id. at 8 (Belknap points out that some southern white sheriffs "courageously 
397 2004] SHADES OF RACE 
When the civil rights movement began to make serious gains in the 
1950s and 1960s, white violence repeatedly met black progress.82 
Invidious discrimination was ubiquitous throughout the coun­
try in 1963-1964. In the context of Title VII and the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, however, it is important to recognize that legal racial 
discrimination in America was a one-way street. The evil that the 
Civil Rights Act was designed to end was the evil of white discrimi­
nation against other races, and in particular against blacks. This is 
what the Representatives and Senators who spoke on the floor of 
Congress meant when they used the term "discrimination;" it seems 
only reasonable to shade our modern understanding of the term 
with the inescapable reality of the history of white racism in 
America. 
III. BORN IN FIRE: TITLE VII AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
Title VII, in order to be properly understood, must be ex­
amined from its genesis: the heated struggle for civil rights in 1963 
and 1964.83 
In 1963, when the bill which would become the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act was submitted to Congress, the nation was embroiled in 
a long, violent, and visible struggle over the inequities caused by 
racism in America. On June 11, 1963 President Kennedy was 
forced to deploy National Guard troops to the University of Ala­
pama to impose a desegregation order that Alabama Governor 
George Wallace had vowed to fight.84 For months, Americans had 
witnessed sweeping demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, and 
other cities throughout the South and across the country. They had 
watched in April and Mayas police in Birmingham, led by Theoph­
ilus Eugene "Bull" Connor,ss turned fire hoses on demonstrators, 
and met resistance with batons, attack dogs and cattle prods.86 They 
had watched on Good Friday as Martin Luther King, Jr. was led to 
jail for defying a court injunction forbidding more demonstra­
defended black prisoners from would-be lynchers," but many more stood by and did 
nothing). 
82. Loevy, supra note 50, at 23 (white community reacted to the Selma bus boy­
cott by bombing buildings and attacking boycotters). 
83. The struggle, and the violent backlash against desegregation, did not begin in 
1963. For a history of the violent repression of black southerners during the post Brown 
v. Board of Education era see BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 27-52. 
84. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOP­
MENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 75 (1992). 
85. Id. at 74. 
86. Id. 
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tions.87 They had watched as nearly a thousand black children, or­
ganized by the Southern Christian Leadership Council, were carted 
off to jail for protesting Birmingham's segregationist policies.88 
And they had watched as racists reacted to the May 10, 1963 deseg­
regation agreement of Birmingham by setting off bombs.89 
Birmingham was not the only city in the country torn by racial 
strife. In April, William L. Moore, a white integrationist who had 
taken it upon himself to walk from Tennessee to Mississippi to pro­
test segregation, was shot dead on the road in Alabama, only a day 
after beginning his walk.90 Those who tried to finish his walk were 
repeatedly arrested in order to prevent the completion of the 
"Freedom Walk."91 In Baltimore, hundreds of protestors had been 
arrested for demonstrating against the refusal of the owners of the 
Northwood Theatre to allow black patrons onto the premises.92 In 
Greenwood, Mississippi, violence erupted in February, March and 
April as white racists attempted to halt a voter registration drive by 
bombing, shooting at and otherwise terrorizing workers trying to 
register Leflore County's black population.93 
Later that summer there were demonstrations in the North 
both in support of and in opposition to the continuing movement 
for civil rights. In New York, 800 were arrested during an effort to 
integrate union apprentice programs;94 in New Jersey, 128 people 
were arrested for picketing a discriminatory construction site in 
Elizabeth;95 in Chicago there was a series of anti-integration ac­
tions, including a protest by some 4,000 whites opposed to an ordi­
nance barring discrimination in housing;96 in Philadelphia, forty-six 
persons were injured in fighting between protestors and police at 
pickets against discrimination in city construction projects;97 again 
in Philadelphia, in August, Horace and Sarah Baker, a black couple, 
were prevented from occupying a home they had bought in a white 
87. HARRY S. ASHMORE, HEARTS AND MINDS; THE ANATOMY OF RACISM FROM 
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 351-52 (1982). 
88. Id. at 352. 
89. Id. at 353. 
90. CiVIL RIGHTS 1960-66, at 193 (Lester A. Sobel ed., 1967) [hereinafter CIVIL 
RIGHTS]' 
91. Id. at 194. 
92. Id. at 195. 
93. Id. at 192-93 (indicating 64% of Leflore County's population of approxi­
mately 45,000 was black but only 250 blacks were registered to vote). 
94. Id. at 208. 
95. Id. at 211. 
96. Id. at 212. 
97. Id. at 212, 213. 
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neighborhood by a mob of angry whites who broke windows in 
their house and later set it on fire;98 and in Detroit 125,000 people 
participated in a city-sanctioned parade opposing discrimination.99 
All of this culminated in the August March on Washington, where 
200,000 people heard Martin Luther King, Jr. give his famous "I 
Have A Dream" speech. And, only a month later, the 16th Street 
Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama was bombed, killing four 
little girls, and rousing the disgust of blacks' and whites alike.lOo 
These were only a few of the dozens, if not hundreds of incidents of 
racial struggle occurring throughout the country in 1963.101 
On the evening of June 11th, Kennedy went on national televi­
sion to address the issue of racial discrimination in America.102 In 
his speech, the President reminded Americans of the founding prin­
ciples of the nation: that "all men are created equal, and the rights 
of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are 
threatened. "103 Kennedy told the country that he was sending pro­
posed legislation to Congress to address some of the issues raised 
by demonstrators, including protecting the right to vote, ending seg­
regation in the public schools, and dismantling the pervasive Jim 
Crow laws of the South. The President asked white Americans to 
imagine' themselves constricted by the effects of the kind of perva­
sive discrimination inflicted on blacks: 
If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a 
restaurant open to the public; if he cannot send his children to 
the best public schools available; if he cannot vote for the public 
officials who represent him; if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full 
and free life which all of us want, then who among us would be 
content to have the color of his skin changed and stand in his 
place?104 
He reminded the country that blacks had been freed from slav­
ery one hundred years prior to his speech that night, and yet still 
98. [d. at 213. 
99. [d. at 214. 
100. BELKNAP, supra note 59, at 121. 
101. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 168-214; BELKNAP, supra note 59, 
at 119 ("During 1963 ten persons died in circumstances directly related to racial pro­
tests, and there were at least thirty-five bombings in the South."). 
102. President's Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil 
Rights, 237 PUB. PAPERS 468 (June 11, 1963). 
103. [d. 
104. [d. at 469. 
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were not free "from social and economic oppression. "105 
On June 19th, the President sent his proposed legislation to 
Congress.106 The text of the bill, to be called the "Civil Rights Act 
of 1963" was divided into eight Titles, each of which dealt with a 
separate issue, including voting rights, discrimination in public ac­
commodations, desegregation of public schools, and, under Title 
VII of the proposed act, the establishment of a Commission on 
Equal Employment Opportunity.107 Unfortunately, Congress did 
not take up formal debate on the legislation until January of 1964, 
so President Kennedy would not live to see his legislation make its 
way through Congress. lOS 
On January 31, 1964, Congressman Madden introduced Reso­
lution 616, which called for the House to consider as a body for ten 
hours of debate what had become H.R. 7152, "The Civil Rights Act 
of 1963."109 It is clear from Mr. Madden's introduction of the Act 
to the House that the Act and all its Titles were intended to work 
together in order to secure full civil rights for blacks.1 lO Congress­
man Madden was also quite clear about whom the employment 
provision of the bill was designed to help. In criticizing a "watered­
down" 1960 civil rights bill, Madden pointed out that the bill "failed 
to make effective provisions for employment to improve the unem­
ployment situation as it pertained to Negroes."l11 "In 1947 to 1951, 
the rate of unemployment for Negro men and women was 50 per­
cent more than it was for whites."112 Even the bill's opponents in 
the House conceded that the legislation was intended to improve. 
the lives of black Americans.113 In fact, a reading of the debate on 
the bill in the House leaves absolutely no doubt in the reader's 
mind: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed and implemented 
in response to the growing sense of "moral outrage"114 in the coun­
105. Id. Later that night, Medgar Evers, a leader of the Mississippi NAACP, was 
gunned down outside his house. ASHMORE, supra note 87, at 375. 
106. CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 175. 
107. 237 PUB. PAPERS at 470. 
108. CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 178. 
109. 110 CONGo REC. H1511 (1964) (statement of Rep. Madden). 
110. Id. at H1512. 
111. Id. 
112. /d. As was pointed out earlier, black unemployment has consistently re­
mained nearly double that of whites over the last forty years. See infra notes 150-152 
and accompanying text. 
113. 110 CONGo REC. H1515 (1964) (comments of Rep. Colmer, in stating his be­
lief that the bill was unconstitutional: "Of course, the advocates of this legislation are in 
favor of helping the Negro. So am I ...."). 
114. 110 CONGo REC. H1521 (1964) (comments of Rep. Cellar). 
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try regarding discrimination against African Americans.115 As 
Congressman Minish of New Jersey succinctly put it: "No one can 
deny that Negroes receive the brunt of the burden of discrimina­
tion."116 Or, more eloquently, the words of Congressman Libonati 
of Illinois: 
The loyalty of the American Negro belongs to no other flag. His 
lineage can be traced to no other nation. He was a captured 
human being. Yet, 100 years after his emancipation throughout 
the land he is denied the rights of citizenship and the opportuni­
ties of education, employment, and social status enjoyed by his 
fellow Americans. We can no longer tolerate this condition.117 
In particular, there was no doubt that the benefits of Title VII 
were designed to improve the economic plight of blacks.l1S 
There was no sense in the debates in either the House or the 
Senate that whites were in need of protection from discrimination, 
because whites were not suffering from discrimination. 119 The bill 
as understood by its advocates in the House-those who voted it 
into law-was as a remedial measure120 designed to begin the pro­
cess of overturning a century's worth of Jim CroW. 121 Both sides in 
115. 110 CONGo REc. H1539 (1964) (comments of Rep. Rodino: "For too long 
Negroes in America have been denied that most fundamental democratic right, the 
right to vote. . .. And for too long Negroes in America have been denied the equal 
opportunity to jobs .... These wrongs cry out for redress."). See also H.R. REP. No. 
88-914, at 2393 (1964). "Most glaring ... is the discrimination against Negroes," the 
Report stated. "Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation, Ne­
groes ... are by virtue of one or another type of discrimination not accorded the rights, 
privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and must be, the birthright of 
all citizens." [d. 
116. 110 CONGo REc. H1599 (1964) (statement of Rep. Minish). 
117. [d. (statement of Rep. Libonati). 
118. See, e.g., 110 CONGo REc. H1539 (1964) (comments of Rep. Rodino: "[F]or 
too long Negroes in America have been denied equal opportunity to jobs."); 110 CONGo 
REc. H1540 (1964) (comments of Rep. 10elson: "The equal employment features of the 
bill will serve to give minority groups the economic advantages without which the other 
advantages would be meaningless."); 110 CONGo REc. H1583 (1964) (comments of Rep. 
Berry: "H.R. 7152 deals partially with civil rights, but the bulk of the bill deals with 
economic rights and social rights for the Negro."). 
119. See 110 CONGo REc. H2728 (1964) (amendment by Rep. Dowdy to include a 
prohibition against discrimination towards Caucasian, white and Protestant Americans 
was rejected by a voice vote). 
120. See 110 CONGo REc. H1628 (1964) (comments of Rep. Halpern: "For the 
first time since the Civil War the American People as a whole have come to realize the 
desperate plight of the Negro, the basic justice of his demands, and the need for reme­
dial action. "). 
121. See 110 CONGo REC. H1592 (1964) (comments of Rep. Corman: "A hundred 
years ago, we took the Negro out of the marketplace as a commodity. It is time we put 
him back in the marketplace as a customer."); 110 CONGo REc. H1517 (1964) (com­
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the debate understood that the situation as it was would not remain 
stable, and that in order to secure equal rights for blacks, whites 
would have to sacrifice some of the privileges they enjoyed because 
of the history of repression and segregation.122 But, as the majority 
declared, these sacrifices were necessary in order to redress the in­
justices caused by the repression and segregation of black Ameri­
cans.123 It was just as clear to these members of Congress that the 
sacrifices were acceptable in the effort to balance the scales of jus­
tice, and that in the end this redressing of grievances and balancing 
of rights would benefit all Americans, black and white, by securing 
the fruits of freedom for al1.124 
The mood of the debate on the Senate floor was much more 
contentious than that in the House; however, there are repeated 
references in the debates by members of both sides which make it 
very clear that the Senate, too, believed Title VII was primarily in­
tended to benefit African Americans,125 that employment discrimi­
nation against whites was simply non-existent,126 and that the Act 
ments of Rep. Cellar: "[W]hat we are considering this day in effect is a bill on a petition 
in the language of our Constitution for a redress of grievances. The grievances are real 
and genuine, the proof is in, the gathering of evidence has gone on for over a 
century."). 
122. See 110 CONGo REC. H1546 (1964) (comments of Rep. Watson: "1 believe in 
respecting the rights of the minorities as much as any man or woman in this body. But 
at the same time, 1 believe in respecting the rights of the majority. You cannot give one 
excessive rights without in turn trampling upon the rights of others."). 
123. 110 CONG REc. H1517 (1964) (comments of Rep. Celler: "1 am not unaware 
of the price that must be paid by some for the advance of the cause of civil rights .... 1 
wish truly that it could be otherwise, but unfortunately, it cannot."). 
124. See 110 CONGo REc. H1625-26 (1964). According to Rep. Rooney: 
The passage of this bill will not only insure the Negro of his rightful place in 
American society, but it will also lay to rest many of the unfounded fears 
which have plagued our national life. We cannot endure, as a free nation, if 
we are afraid to abide by the concepts of freedom which caused this country to 
be founded. 
Id. See also 110 CONGo REc. H1512 (1964) (comments of Rep. Celler: "[Every Ameri­
can citizen] should realize that freedom for minorities is indivisible with freedom for the 
majority and that unless everyone enjoys freedom, no one's freedom is secure."). 
125. 110 CONGo REC. S7253 (1964) (comment of Sen. Ervin: "Why is it necessary 
to create a new Federal bureaucracy to help 895,000 nonwhites get jobs while the Con­
gress does not concern itself about the 3,629,000 unemployed whites ... ?"). 
126. [d. (colloquy between Senators Ervin and Case: Sen. Case: "[T]he rate for 
Negro unemployment is more than two times as great as for white. The difference 
indicates something." Sen. Ervin: "Does the Senator contend that any of these 
3,629,000 white [unemployed] individuals denied employment because of their race or 
color?" Sen. Case then suggested that Sen. Ervin's question was frivolous. Sen. Ervin 
responded: "Does the Senator from New Jersey think it is frivolous to those 3,629,000 
white individuals without jobs?" Sen. Case responded: "The question was whether 
2004] SHADES OF RACE 403 
itself was designed to remedy the "injustices suffered by American 
Negroes and other minority groups"127 over the previous three hun­
dred years of slavery and segregation.128 What is more, in his intro­
duction of Title VII to the floor of the Senate, Senator Case made it 
quite plain that Title VII was not only designed to bring down the 
level of black unemployment,129 it was also designed to bring Afri­
can Americans into the professions.13° He stated, "[a]lmost one­
half of the white employees of the country are in white-collar jobs," 
but "among [nonwhites], service workers and blue-collar workers 
constitute approximately three-fourths of the total number ... who 
are employed. "131 
Finally, it must be said that the opposition in the Senate and 
the House was not concerned with voluntary affirmative action or 
diversity in the workplace; the opposition believed that the bill 
would remove from employers entirely the right to decide whom to 
hire and whom to fire.132 The opposition believed that the Act was 
being pushed by "militant groups"133 and that the problems facing 
African Americans were entirely their own fault. 134 One opponent 
stated, "Negroes can consider themselves first class citizens if they 
earn the right to become so, ... laws passed by the Congress cannot 
provide the Negro with the future he wants, ... the answer to the 
those whites were unemployed because of discrimination based on their white color. 
That was a frivolous question. I shall be glad to answer any serious question."). 
127. 110 CONGo REC. Sl1,053 (1964) (comments of Sen. Humphrey). 
128. 110 CONGo REC. S7247 (1964) (comments of Sen. Case: "I find it hard to 
believe that anyone in his heart of hearts can deny that injustice and suppression have 
been the lot of generations of Negro Americans."). 
129. 110 CONGo REC. S7240 (comments of Sen. Case: "A fair chance for a decent 
job-who cannot understand this-for freedom without the means of utilizing and en­
joying it is an empty thing."). 
130. 110 CONGo REc. S7241 (comments of Sen. Case). 
131. [d. In addition, Senator Case discussed income disparities, pointing out that 
black workers median income was slightly more than half that of white workers, and 
that a nonwhite man with a college education was likely to earn less over a lifetime than 
a white with only an eighth grade education. [d. 
132. See 110 CONGo REC. S7074 (1964) (comments of Sen. Stennis); 110 CONGo 
REC. H1618 (1964) (comments of Rep. Abernethy); 110 CONGo REC. H1645 (1964) 
(comments of Rep. Alger). 
133. 110 CONGo REC. S7022 (1964) (comments of Sen. Holland). 
134. 110 CONGo REC. S7020 (1964) (comments of Sen. Holland: "I think the 
trouble is that no one tells the Negro that he's responsible for himself-being unem­
ployed.") (citation omitted). See also 110 CONGo REC. H1621 (1964) (comments of 
Rep. Abernethy: "The present Negro leadership blames every ill on racial discrimina­
tion. Every Negro failure, every Negro fault ... is blamed on the white man's 
discrimination ...."). 
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Negro's future is hard work ...."135 Other opponents believed that 
there were no racial problems at a11.136 The Senators and Congress­
men who eventually voted against the Act were terrified of the 
"Federal Government ... dictat[ing] which employees [a small busi­
nessman] could promote.· Federal agents would be looking over his 
shoulder all the time. "137 As with every other step in the struggle 
for civil rights, those intent on maintaining white supremacy, even 
those in government, resisted any infringement of their domination 
and were willing to go to almost any length to maintain it.138 
That the fears of government infringement on the privacy of all 
Americans through the Civil Rights Act have not come to pass goes 
without saying, and yet statements made by supporters of the Act 
to mollify these frankly racist ravings have, in the end, been used by 
opponents of Title VII to deny the right of employers to hire and 
fire and promote whom they wish.139 This sort of reading not only 
violates the spirit of Title VII, it grants too much power to those 
who opposed the Act-those who worked tirelessly against the 
Act's passage and who would likely never have voted for any kind 
of civil rights act, no matter how attenuated. 
In the end, the report issued to the House, H.R. 914, summed 
up the purposes of the Act: "Today, more than 100 years after their 
formal emancipation, Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our 
population, are by virtue of . . . discrimination not afforded the 
rights, privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and 
must be, the birthright of all citizens."14o Part of the virtue of the 
Act, according to the report, was that it would do more than deal 
with "the most troublesome problems" of discrimination, it would 
135. 110 CONGo REC. S7020 (1964) (comments of Sen. Holland). 
136. See 110 CONGo REC. H1537 (1964) (comments of Rep. Whitener); see also 
110 CONGo REC. H1546 (1964) (comments of Rep. Watson). 
137. 110 CONGo REC. S7074 (1964) (comments of Sen. Stennis). 
138. In 1958, Governor Faubus of Arkansas closed the state's public schools 
rather than allow integration to go forward. DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFER­
ENCE 119 (1988). In 1960, Southern Senators initiated a round-the-clock filibuster to 
defeat the civil rights bill of that year. See CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 23 ("In 
preparation for the filibuster, 40 cots had been moved into the Senate offices and com­
mittee rooms for the use of Senators unable to go home to sleep for days at a stretch."). 
139. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America V. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,233 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist uses speeches by Senators Lindsay and 
Minish-given in an attempt to assuage the extremist fears of Southern Senators that 
the Federal government would be "looking over [every employers] shoulder" and forc­
ing them to hire underqualified blacks-to support his contention that any racial pref­
erence would be illegal. Id. 
140. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 2393 (1964). 
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also "create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary . . . resolu­
tion."141 And in an Additional View Report, several Congressmen 
noted that the problems of unemployment and poverty caused by 
discrimination were having broad, invidious effects on the African 
American community, including a higher infant mortality rate, 
shorter life expectancy, and a disincentive to achieve in education 
or the workplace.142 All this contributed to "deny[ing] to the Na­
tion the full benefit of the skills, intelligence, cultural endeavor, and 
general excellence which the Negro will contribute if afforded the 
rights of first-class citizenship."143 
The legislative history, especially when viewed in the context 
of the larger social and historical movements which brought about 
the legislation in the first place, supports the view that Title VII was 
directed at improving the position of African Americans in order to 
benefit all of America. 
IV. 	 THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN 
THE WORKPLACE 
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted forty years ago as an 
enormous omnibus piece of legislation designed to eliminate the 
most egregious forms of discrimination facing black Americans. Ti­
tle VII was included as part of that legislation because, as President 
Kennedy himself said: "There is little value in a Negro's obtaining 
the right to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no cash 
in his pocket and no job."144 Or, as Senator Humphrey said in his 
remarks on the Senate floor, the legislation was needed to "open 
employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have 
been traditionally closed to them."145 So it seems reasonable to 
ask, forty years later, whether Title VII has opened employment 
opportunities for black Americans in occupations that had been tra­
ditionally closed to them. In attempting to answer that question, 
this Note examines employment figures in one employment area 
traditionally closed to African Americans: the Law. 
There is some good news to tell: from 1983 to 2000, the per­
centage of black lawyers in America more than doubled. The bad 
news is that in 1983, only 2.6% of all lawyers in America were Afri­
141. [d. 
142. [d. at 2514-15. 
143. [d. 
144. 109 CONGo REC. Sll,159 (1963). 
145. 110 CONGo REc. S6548 (1964) (comment by Sen. Humphrey). 
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can American. In 2000, the percentage had risen to 5.4%.146 (Afri­
can Americans make-up approximately 11.3% of the general 
American workforce).147 To understand precisely what these num­
bers mean, it is necessary to look at the larger economic picture for 
black Americans in relation to their white counterparts. As of 
1999, the median household income in the United States was 
$40,816; for whites the figure was $42,504, while for black Ameri­
cans the median household income was just $27,910.148 And while 
11.8% of all Americans were living below the poverty line in 1999, 
only 9.8% of whites were, while nearly a fourth of all African 
Americans, or 23.6%, were living below the poverty line.149 
Part of the income disparity is clearly due to the continuing 
divergence in unemployment between blacks and whites in this 
country. In 1968, the unemployment rate for white males was 
3.0%, while that for "non-white" males (the only other racial cate­
gory recognized by the census at the time) was more than double, at 
7.1 %.150 In 1980, whites were unemployed at a rate of 6.3%; blacks 
at 14.3%-again more than double the figure for whites.151 In 
2000, unemployment had gone down for both groups, but while 
white unemployment had dropped to 3.5%, black unemployment 
was at 7.6%.152 The pattern of unemployment is clear-no matter 
how well or how poorly the economy is doing, black workers will be 
unemployed at roughly twice the rate of white workers. 
Another part of the income disparity is bound to the kinds of 
jobs generally held by black workers in comparison to their white 
counterparts. For example, in 1993 (the latest occupation figures 
available),153 when blacks made up 10.2% of the workforce, the 
census found there were 529,000 financial managers (Wayne 
Tappe's job) in the country.154 Of these, only 4.4% were black.155 
Of the 605,000 doctors, only 3.7% were black.156 And of the 
146. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACf OF THE UNITED 
STATES 380 (2001) [hereinafter CENSUS 2001]. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 433. 
149. Id. at 442. 
150. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACf OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1970). 
151. CENSUS 2001, supra note 146, at 386. 
152. Id. 
153. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACf OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1994). 
154. Id. at 407. 
155. /d. 
156. Id. 
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769,000 computer systems analysts in the nation, just 5.8% were 
black.ls7 
These figures demonstrate that in highly-skilled professions 
blacks are, as a percentage of the workforce in relation to their 
numbers in the general population, severely under-represented. At 
the other end of the spectrum, in traditionally low and un-skilled 
jobs, blacks are seriously over-represented. For example, of the 
nearly two million cooks in the nation, almost 20% were black,1s8 
Of the three million persons employed in "cleaning and building 
service occupations" (in other words, janitors and maids), 22.4% 
were black.ls9 And over 30% of the nearly two million nursing 
aides, orderlies and attendants in 1993 were African American,160 
It is into this picture that one must place the numbers of black 
lawyers in America. Clearly, things have improved. In 2000, 5.4% 
of the lawyers in the country were black.161 At a few of the coun­
try's largest law firms, the percentage is higher-in 2000, at two 
large law firms, 7.3% of the associates were black, fully 50% above 
the national average,162 However, after that 7.3%, the numbers 
drop and the percentage of black associates among all associates at 
all large law firms combined is only 4.1 %, 20% below the national 
average of all black lawyers,163 And of the partners at all large law 
firms, 96.1 % are white, while only 1.9% are black,164 
In terms of erasing the lingering effects of segregation, then, 
the legal profession has a long way to go. And while it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine how much of the growth that there has 
been in the number of black lawyers has been due to the positive 
effects of Title VII and other anti-discrimination legislation, it is 
clear that Title VII and its brethren have not yet fulfilled their re­
medial purpose of making black Americans equal players in the 
employment marketplace. 
157. Id. These same statistics reveal that African Americans comprised just 3.1 % 
of architects, 3.7% of engineers, 4.8% of university professors, and held only 6.2% of all 
executive, administrative and managerial positions in the country. Id. 
158. CENSUS 2001, supra note 146, at 409. Interestingly, only 3.8% of the bar­
tenders and 4.6% of the waiters were black. Id. 
159. ld. 
160. Id. In addition, 14.9% of laborers, 26.8% of the postal clerks, and 27.5% of 
the nations barbers were black. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Brian Zabcik, Measuring Up (And Down), THE MINORITY LAW JOURNAL, 
Spring, 2002, available at http://www.minoritylawjournal.comlspring02/texts/measuring. 
html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
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V. 	 HISTORICALLY INFORMED JURISPRUDENCE: UNITED 
STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA V. WEBER 
The central contextual reading of Title VII was and remains 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.165 Although decided 
nearly a quarter of a century ago, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Weber remains controversial.166 It also remains the law of the land, 
although some commentators call for it to be overturned.167 Con­
sidering the current makeup of the Supreme Court, these commen­
tators may yet see their wish come true. However, it is not difficult 
to argue that the Weber court was right-when read in its proper 
context, Title VII not only allows for but encourages affirmative 
action in the workplace. Weber's detractors, exemplified by the an­
gry dissent penned by then Associate Justice William Rehnquist, 
have simply blinded themselves to the true purpose and intent of 
Congress in enacting Title VII. 
The facts of Weber are as follows: in 1974, United Steelworkers 
of America entered into a collective bargaining agreement with 
Weber's employer, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.168 As part 
of this agreement, Kaiser instituted a new training program in an 
effort to promote more black workers as craftworkers, an area of 
Kaiser which, before the program was instituted, was less than 2 % 
black at the Gramercy, Louisiana plant where Weber was em­
ployed.169 The training program earmarked 50% of the available 
spots for black workers pO Weber was a white worker at the Gra­
mercy plant who was denied a place in the craftwork training pro­
gram despite the fact that he was a more senior employee than all 
of the black employees selected.171 Thereafter, Weber brought suit 
alleging that the affirmative action program violated § 703(a) of Ti­
165. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Although Weber was concerned with formal affirmative 
action programs, the analysis of the majority demonstrates the Court's understanding of 
the history and purposes of Title VII in a manner that is consonant with the purposes of 
this Note. 
166. See, e.g., Ken Feagins, Affirmative Action or the Same Sin?, 67 DENV. U.L. 
REV. 421,434 (1990). See also Book Note, Affirmative Action Anonymous, 104 HARV. 
L. REV. 967,969-72 (1991) (reviewing MELVIN UROFSKY, A CONFLICT OF RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION) [hereinafter Affirmative Action 
Anonymous]. 
167. See, e.g., Feagins, supra note 166, at 440; Affirmative Action Anonymous, 
supra note 166, at 971. 
168. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98. 
169. Id. at 198. 
170. /d. 
171. Id. at 199. 
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tIe VIIl72 by promoting junior employees into the training program 
over more senior employees based solely on their race.173 The two 
lower courts found that the affirmative action program was racially 
discriminatory, the Fifth Circuit holding that "all employment pref­
erences based upon race, including those preferences incidental to 
bona fide affirmative action plans, violated Title VII's prohibition 
against racial discrimination in employment. "174 
Justice Brennan's majority opinion relied heavily on "the back­
ground of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical con­
text from which the Act arose."175 This is because the statute itself, 
if "literally constructed," appears to prohibit all forms of racial dis­
crimination in employmentP6 The question the Court wanted to 
ask, is why did Congress intend to eliminate discrimination from 
the workplace? As we have seen, Title VII, indeed all of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, is a remedial statute-that is, it was designed 
and intended to remedy a wrong. l77 The Court recognized that the 
wrong Congress was trying to remedy with Title VII was "the plight 
of the Negro in our economy."178 
The majority's view of the statute seems inescapable when one 
considers the purposes of the Civil Rights Act itself, which was "the 
integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society."179 
For instance, Title II of the Act, a provision almost as controversial 
in the Congressional debates as Title VII, prohibited owners of res­
172. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (2004). 
173. Weber, 443 U.S. at 199. 
174. Id. at 200. 
175. Id. at 201. 
176. Id. The section of the statute regarding illegal employment practices, says 
that 
lilt shall be an unlawful unemployment practice for an employer-(l) to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (2004). See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Inter­
pretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1489 (1987) ("It is ... plausible to interpret the 
antidiscrimination rule to penalize only discrimination which is invidious, for the term 
'discrimination' in common usage means something more than just different 
treatment. "). 
177. See ASHMORE, supra note 87. 
178. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (citing the remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
179. Id. 
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taurants, hotels and other "public accommodations" from discrimi­
nating against people on the basis of color.180 Title I was designed 
to eliminate discrimination in voting,181 while Title IV codified the 
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education 182 out­
lawing segregation in schools. I83 All of the provisions of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act were designed and implemented to prevent forms 
of discrimination that were being used by whites against blacks, in 
order to maintain white supremacy. The provisions were passed as 
a group in order to effect the broadest, most complete change in the 
quality of life for black Americans possible.184 As eloquently de­
scribed in an Additional Views report accompanying the House Re­
port, the purposes of the Civil Rights Act were clear: 
More than a hundred years have elapsed since the Negro has 
been freed from the bonds of slavery. Yet, to this day, the Negro 
continues to bear the burdens of a race under the traces of servi­
tude. In employment, education, public service, amusement, 
housing and citizenship, the Negro has faced the barrier of racial 
inequality. In [the] titles of this legislation, we have sought to 
fashion workable tools to correct this inequity.I85 
The titles of the Act were therefore designed to work together 
in order to eliminate these burdens of racism. As the Weber Court 
said: "Congress recognized that [the integration of blacks into 
mainstream American society] would not be possible unless blacks 
were able to secure jobs which have a future."186 Or, put more 
bluntly: "There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be 
admitted to hotels and restaurants if he has no cash in his pocket 
and no job."187 Viewed in this light-that Title VII was part of a 
larger package of laws intended to end a century of continuous and 
systematic discrimination directed against blacks by whites intent 
on maintaining white supremacy after emancipation-it became in­
180. 110 CONGo REc. H1511 (1964) (statement of Rep. Madden). 
181. [d. 
182. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
183. 110 CONGo REc. H1511 (1964) (statement of Rep. Madden). 
184. 110 CONGo REc. H1529 (1964) (comments of Rep. McCulloch: "Hundreds of 
thousands of citizens are denied the basic right to vote. Thousands of school districts 
remain segregated. Decent hotel and eating accommodations frequently lie hundreds 
of miles apart for the Negro traveler."). 
185. 914 H.R. 2393. 
186. United Steelworkers of America V. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979) 
(quoting remarks of Sen. Clark) (internal quotes omitted). 
187. [d. at 203 (quoting President Kennedy's introductory remarks to the Civil 
Rights Act in 1963). 
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cumbent upon the Court to look beyond "the letter of the statute" 
to find what was "within its spirit [and] within the intention of its 
makers."188 Additionally, when the Court looked to the intention 
of Title VII's makers in this way, it said that to interpret Title VII to 
forbid "all race-conscious affirmative action would bring about an 
end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute...."189 
The Court thus held that Title VII "[did] not condemn all private, 
voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans," despite the 
text's apparent literal prohibition of discrimination based on 
race.190 
Title VII "was enacted pursuant to the commerce power," and 
so does not "incorporate and particularize the commands of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."191 What this means is that, 
particularly in regard to private employment, there is no Equal Pro­
tection requirement contained in Title VII,192 At the same time, 
the Court recognized that the literal dictates of Title VII cannot be 
completely ignored. Thus the Court required that affirmative ac­
tion plans be limited in their impact in order to avoid "unnecessa­
rily trammel [ing] the interests of the white employees."193 
Permissible affirmative action plans, according to the Court, cannot 
require a white person be fired and replaced with a black person.194 
In addition, the plan must be a temporary measure put in place to 
"eliminate a manifest racial imbalance," and it cannot "create an 
absolute bar to the advancement of white employees. "195 In so 
finding, the Court tried to balance the protection Title VII affords 
white employees,196 while promoting the "ultimate statutory goals" 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,197 
188. [d. at 201 (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 
(1892)). 
189. [d. at 202 (citing United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 
(1953) (internal quotes omitted)). 
190. [d. at 208. 
191. [d. at 207 n.6. 
192. [d. 
193. [d. 
194. [d. at 208 (citing McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 
(1976)). 
195. [d. 
196. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280. 
197. Weber, 443 U.S. at 207. 
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In Johnson v. Transportation Agency,198 the Court again 
looked at the question of affirmative action first decided in Weber. 
If the Court had wanted to overrule its original decision, this would 
have been a good time to do it. Instead, the Court reinforced its 
finding in Weber and expanded it to include public sphere applica­
tions of workplace affirmative action. In this case, the affirmative 
action program was one promulgated by the Transportation Agency 
of Santa Clara County. Johnson, a white male, was passed over for 
road dispatcher in favor of a female applicant, Joyce. Both were 
qualified, Johnson receiving a score of 75 out of 80 on the relevant 
aptitude test (tied for second among seven applicants); Joyce was 
next, having scored a 73.199 
What is most interesting about the holding in Johnson is the 
Court's finding that once a majority plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas 
test, a valid affirmative action plan is an acceptable nondiscrimina­
tory reason for the employment decision which shifts the burden 
back to the plaintiff.2oo Once the defendant employer demonstrates 
its affirmative action plan, the burden is on the plaintiff to show 
that the program itself is invalid and is in reality only a pretext for a 
decision which has no valid nondiscriminatory justification.201 That 
an affirmative action program is a valid nondiscriminatory business 
decision follows the Court's holding in Weber, where the Court 
found that "taking race into account was consistent with Title VII's 
objective of breaking down old patterns of racial segregation and 
hierarchy.''202 
Even more interesting was the Court's acceptance of Justice 
Blackmun's concurrence in Weber: 
As Justice Blackmun's concurrence made clear, Weber held that 
198. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
199. Id. at 623-24. 
200. /d. at 626 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 
(1986» ("We held that the ultimate burden remains with the employees to demonstrate 
the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program ....") (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
201. Id. According to the Johnson Court the Weber decision "was grounded in 
the recognition that voluntary employer action can playa crucial role in furthering Title 
VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the workplace, and that 
Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts." Id. at 630. 
202. Id. at 628 (internal quotes and cites omitted). 
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an employer seeking to justify the adoption of a plan need not 
point to its own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to evi­
dence of an "arguable violation" on its part. Rather, it need 
point only to a "conspicuous ... imbalance in traditionally segre­
gated job categories."203 
Under this reasoning, it isn't necessary for an employer to 
demonstrate that the employer itself had ever discriminated in its 
employment practices, only that the job category itself has been 
"traditionally segregated."204 In such circumstances, affirmative ac­
tion designed to end that traditional segregation is acceptable under 
Title VII. 
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens argued that the ruling of 
McDonald205 was no longer controlling: "Neither the 'same stan­
dards' language used in McDonald, nor the 'color blind' rhetoric 
used by the Senators and Congressmen who enacted the bill, is now 
controlling."206 According to Stevens, at least, McDonald had been 
functionally overruled by Weber and Johnson. 
Stevens also said that the decision in Weber, and now in John­
son, is drawn from "[t]he logic of antidiscrimination legislation 
[which] requires that judicial constructions of Title VII leave 
'breathing room' for employer initiatives to benefit members of mi­
nority groupS."207 It is the logic of the statute-the very purpose of 
this remedial statute itself-which determines that voluntary af­
firmative action was permissible in some circumstances because a 
prohibition of every type of "affirmative action would bring about 
an end completely at variance with the purpose of the stat­
ute ...."208 This purpose, according to the Court in Johnson, was 
to "open employment opportunities for blacks in occupations that 
had been traditionally closed to them. "209 The Court has twice con­
203. [d. at 630 (emphasis added). 
204. [d. See also id. at 652 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While employers must have 
a firm basis for concluding that remedial action is necessary, neither Wygant nor Weber 
places a burden on employers to prove that they actually discriminated against women 
or minorities."). 
205. "We therefore hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination 
against the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applica­
ble were they Negroes and Jackson white." McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 
427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). 
206. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
207. [d. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
208. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (quoting 
United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953)) (internal quotes 
omitted). 
209. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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strued Title VII as permitting private affirmative action in the 
workplace so long as the employer can point to a "manifest . . . 
imbalanc[e] in traditionally segregated job categories."210 As long 
as the employer can make this showing, the Court will not interfere 
with the employer's business decision because "Congress intended 
that traditional management prerogatives be left undisturbed to the 
greatest extent possible. "211 
VII. THE CREATION OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION UNDER 





In 1976, before they had considered Weber and Johnson, the 
Supreme Court saw its first 'reverse discrimination' case under Title 
VII. In McDonald, the Court gave short shrift to the legislative 
history of the statute, and simply stated that "the uncontradicted 
legislative history [shows] that Title VII was intended to cover 
white men and women and all Americans."212 In McDonald, two 
white workers had been fired by their employer for stealing.213 A 
third employee caught stealing, who was black, was not fired. 214 
The two white workers brought suit, alleging discrimination in vio­
lation of Title VII.21S The Court in McDonald said that Title VII's 
"terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any 
particular race. "216 
However, while recognizing that "Title VII tolerates no racial 
discrimination, subtle or otherwise,"217 the Court also differenti­
ated between simple discrimination and affirmative action, and said 
that the decision in McDonald did not address "the permissibility of 
such a program, whether judicially required or otherwise 
prompted."218 
Thus when the Supreme Court first held that Title VII pro­
tected all persons, it still recognized that there was a difference be­
tween hostile discrimination and the benign discrimination of 
affirmative action. In addition, Justice Marshall made his statement 
210. Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 197). 
211. Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
212. McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (citation 
omitted). 
213. Id. at 276. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 275. 
216. Id. at 278-79. 
217. Id. at 280 n.8 (emphasis omitted). 
218. Id. 
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that the uncontradicted legislative history. showed that whites and 
blacks were meant to be treated the same under the statute after 
only a cursory examination of that legislative history. In this case, 
the legislative history went uncontradicted. In Weber and Johnson 
that view of the legislative history was specifically contradicted. 
The result was, as Justice Stevens said, that "the same standards" 
language used in McDonald was no longer controlling.219 Logi­
cally, this statement is necessarily true: if the Court could uphold 
affirmative action programs that promoted blacks and women over 
white men based on race and sex, then clearly white men, while 
protected by Title VII, could not possibly receive the protection of 
Title VII under the same standards as blacks or women. 
McDonald also did not require that all plaintiffs receive the 
same prima facie test.220 In a footnote, Justice Marshall noted that 
the McDonnell Douglas test had required, as its first prong, that the 
plaintiff be a member of a racial minority group.221 If this were 
true, then the plaintiffs in McDonald would have been unable to 
make out a case of discrimination. Marshall did not offer an alter­
native version of the McDonnell Douglas test for use in reverse dis­
crimination cases. Instead he simply noted that plaintiff was not 
prevented from being able to make out a claim of discrimination 
cognizable under Title VII simply because the case did not fit into 
the rubric of McDonnell Douglas.222 The McDonnell Douglas test 
was "set out only to demonstrate how the racial character of the 
discrimination could be established in the most common sort of 
case, and not as an indication of any substantive limitation of Title 
VII's prohibition of racial discrimination."223 Here Marshall sug­
gests that the McDonnell Douglas test is not required for, or even 
appropriate in, all cases. 
VIII. 	 THE ARGUMENT AGAINST UNEQUAL PROTECTION: 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT IN WEBER 
The central argument against the idea that Title VII allows af­
firmative action was made by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in 
Weber. To this day it is cited by those opposed to affirmative action 
as the definitive statement on the issue. In making his argument, 
219. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 644 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
220. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6. 
221. [d. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973». 
222. /d. 
223. [d. 
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Justice Rehnquist looked at a legislative history very different from 
that detailed in Part III of this Note. 
In Part III A of his dissent, Justice Rehnquist reviewed the 
House debates to find that "the Court's interpretation of Title VII 
is totally refuted by the Act's legislative history."224 Viewing this 
statement in the context of the legislative history outlined above, 
this statement is arguably a complete misreading of the meaning of 
the Act's legislative history. Whatever else the legislative history 
may do, it does not refute the majority's holding in Weber. In find­
ing that Title VII "does not condemn all private, voluntary, race­
conscious affirmative action,"225 the majority relied on much of the 
legislative history cited in this Note. Justice Rehnquist is reading a 
different history than the majority. 
Justice Rehnquist began his review by acknowledging that 
"employment discrimination against Negroes provided the primary 
impetus for passage of Title VII. "226 In acknowledging the employ­
ment problem this way, however, he minimizes the repeated and 
lengthy discussions of the majority in Congress detailing the seri­
ousness of this problem. He also fails to recognize that Title VII 
itself was part of a much larger civil rights bill designed to eliminate 
racial discrimination against blacks and other oppressed minori­
ties.227 For instance, Title II of the bill was designed to require 
owners of public accommodations, like restaurants and hotels, to 
admit all persons regardless of race.228 To say that racial discrimi­
nation in public accommodations was the "impetus" behind that 
piece of the Act is to misstate the situation. Discrimination against 
blacks was not merely the "impetus" behind Title II, it was the very 
purpose of Title II; it was, in and of itself, the wrong requiring a 
remedy. If there had been no Jim Crow, no refusals to seat blacks 
224. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 229 n.ll (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
225. Id. at 208. 
226. [d. at 229 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
227. 110 CONGo REC. H1600 (1964) (Comments of Rep. Minish: "The Title is de­
signed to utilize to the fullest our potential work force .... This can be done by remov­
ing the hurdles that have too long been placed in the path of minority workers who seek 
to realize their rights ...."). 
228. 110 CONGo REC. H15ll (1964). According to Rep. Madden: 
This legislation gives the Attorney General and the aggrieved citizen authority 
to institute a civil action in Federal court against any person who denies an 
individual, because of race ... access to public transportation, interstate travel, 
public eating houses, hotels, admission to places of exhibition and public en­
tertainment, and other establishments supported by public taxation. 
Id. 
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at lunch counters, no separate drinking fountains, there would 
never have been a need for Title II, and so Title II would never 
have existed. Just so with Title VII. Without discrimination against 
blacks, Title VII would never have been enacted because there 
would have been no wrong egregious enough to require Congres­
sional remedy. 
Justice Rehnquist also seems to misunderstand the evil of dis­
crimination. As Justice Rehnquist would have it: "The evil inherent 
in discrimination against Negroes is that it is based on an immuta­
ble characteristic, utterly irrelevant to employment decisions. "229 
But discrimination is not inherently evil; discrimination as a concept 
is neutral. Discrimination is simply the separating of things, or peo­
ple, into identifiable groups. Discrimination becomes evil when it is 
used to oppress a people. The discrimination that the majority in 
Congress was concerned with was the kind of discrimination out­
lined in Part IV above; discrimination as implemented in segrega­
tion was evil because it "denied the rights of first-class citizenship" 
to blacks and other minorities.230 As announced in the Declaration 
of Independence, government is instituted to protect these rights.231 
The evil of discrimination that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was de­
signed to cure was the oppressive discrimination sanctioned, and 
often imposed by, the very government supposedly instituted to 
protect its citizens from oppressive discrimination.232 
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist complained that "discrimina­
tion" was not defined by the statute; however, everyone involved in 
passing the Act knew what the word discrimination meant. It 
meant hostile discrimination directed against blacks.233 It meant 
the kind of discrimination that refused to allow two-thirds of blacks 
to register to vote in Louisiana;234 that prevented 85% of potential 
black voters from registering in 250 counties in the United States;235 
the kind of discrimination that relegated thousands of black stu­
dents to substandard, segregated education; that did not allow chil­
dren to play in parks and playgrounds because they were black 
(even when their parent's tax money was used to pay for those pub­
229. Weber, 443 U.S. at 230 n.1O (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
230. 110 CONGo REC. H1600 (1964) (comments of Rep. Daniels). 
231. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
232. Lovey, supra note 50, at 8. 
233. 110 CONGo REC. H1600 (1964) (statement of Rep. Daniels: "Racial discrimi­
nation still persists throughout our land .... Twenty million Negroes are still denied the 
rights of first class citizenship."). 
234. [d. 
235. 110 CONGo REC. H1517 (1964) (comments of Rep. Cellar). 
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lic facilities);236 the kind of discrimination that forced an entire peo­
ple to live with the "degradation, misery, and human indignities 
which attend second class citizenship ...."237 Discrimination, as a 
word, went undefined in the Act because a definition must have 
seemed, to those members of Congress, unnecessary and 
superfluous. 
It is only by failing to understand Title VII within the context 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, by failing to see the larger historical 
and social context that led to the Act's adoption in the first place, 
that Justice Rehnquist is able to declare that the holding in Weber 
"introduces into Title VII a tolerance for the very evil that the law 
was intended to eradicate ...."238 
There are other problems with Justice Rehnquist's analysis of 
the legislative history. As pointed out in Justice Blackmun's con­
currence, for example, most of the history Justice Rehnquist cites to 
support the idea that Title VII "forbids" affirmative action is actu­
ally only useful to demonstrate that Title VII does not "require" 
affirmative action.239 This is obviously a very important distinc­
tion-one that Justice Rehnquist ignores. This failure to recognize 
the subtlety of language crops up more than once in Justice Rehn­
quist's exegesis. For example, he cites Republican supporters for 
the statement that what Title VII must do is remove "[a]ll vestiges 
of inequality based solely on race,"240 but he fails to note that this 
statement does not say that Title VII will remove all discrimination; 
it says it will remove inequality-a much larger conclusion, and one 
perfectly consonant with affirmative action and the holding of the 
majority. 
This failure to read the subtleties of language is revealed again 
in Justice Rehnquist's complaint that the majority has misread 
§ 703(j)241 of the statute.242 The section plainly says that the Act is 
not to be "interpreted to require any employer ... to grant prefer­
ential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the 
236. 110 CONGo REC. H1529 (1964) (statement of Rep. McCulloch). 
237. 110 CONGo REC. H1627 (1964) (statement of Rep. Halpern). Such "degrada­
tions," according to Congressman Halpern, included: "squalid housing conditions; sec­
ond-rate educational opportunities; employment at the lowest rung of the economic 
ladder." Id. 
238. United Steelworkers of America V. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254-55 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, I., dissenting). 
239. ld. at 215 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
240. Id. at 232 n.12 (Rehnquist, I., dissenting). 
241. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(j). 
242. Weber, 443 U.S. at 227 (Rehnquist, I., dissenting). 
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race of such individual or group."243 The most that Justice 
Rehnquist can muster against the obvious reading that the statute 
clearly does not prohibit preferential treatment, it simply does not 
require it, is to say that this reading is "outlandish" when read in 
conjunction with §§ 703 (a) & (d),244 and that it contradicts the leg­
islative history of the Act,245 which, as has already been shown, is 
simply not the case. 
An aspect of Justice Rehnquist's dissent which must be an­
swered is the assertion that the language of the statute simply "pro­
hibits a covered employer from considering race when making an 
employment decision,"246 and thus contradicts the majority's hold­
ing. A reading of the statute's plain language, according to Justice 
Rehnquist, precludes the possibility of affirmative action. In 
§703(a),247 the statute clearly says that it is unlawful to "discrimi­
nate against any individual ... because of such individual's race."248 
It is, under current law, impossible to argue that choosing to hire a 
black candidate over a white candidate in order to integrate a tradi­
tionally segregated job category does not entail discriminating 
"against" the white person because of his race but instead entails 
discriminating in favor of the black person because of his. This is a 
classic representation of disparate treatment-where persons other­
wise roughly equivalent are treated differently solely because of 
race.249 In other words, the white person is not being passed over 
because he is white-he is being passed over because the other can­
didate is black. As the law stands today, this situation is no differ­
ent than the more traditional and more troubling case where a 
black person is not hired because he is black. 
One answer to Justice Rehnquist's reading of the statute, that 
the express language of Title VII "prohibits a covered employer 
from considering race when making an employment decision," is to 
say that the statute does not say that. Had Congress wanted to 
"prohibit[] a covered employer from considering race when mak­
ing an employment decision"250 it certainly could have said so in 
the simple and express terms Justice Rehnquist uses. That it did not 
243. 42 u.s.c. § 2000-20). See also Weber, 443 U.S. at 227 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
244. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2(a) & (d). 
245. Weber, 443 U.S. at 227-29 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
246. ld. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
247. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a). 
248. ld.; Weber, 443 U.S. at 227 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
249. See, e.g., McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001). 
250. Weber, 443 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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say what Justice Rehnquist wanted it to say means that the statute 
does not necessarily mean what Justice Rehnquist wanted it to 
mean.251 
Still, this cannot be a complete answer to Justice Rehnquist's 
charge. The best way to understand the argument against Justice 
Rehnquist's reading of the statute is to see Justice Rehnquist's ver­
sion of the statute in action. And to do that we have to return to 
where we began, to Wayne Tappe and his Title VII suit against Alli­
ance Capital Management. 
If one accepts the reasoning in Tappe II, what becomes the 
identifying characteristic for protection under Title VII is not 
Tappe's status, but the status of his fellow co-workers. That they 
belong to protected classes makes his firing suspect. However, this 
is only the case because of the way the court has read the first prong 
of the test to mean that everyone is a member of a protected class 
because equal protection requires it. Therefore, the first three 
prongs of the test are essentially eliminated as a matter of law. Any 
time a person is fired he has suffered an adverse employment ac­
tion. Further, because he was presumably qualified for the job in 
the first place (since he must have been hired in order to be availa­
ble for firing), then the fourth prong would be proved simply by the 
fact of his being fired. Even the Tappe II court refuses to go this 
far, so it adds two further points: 1) Tappe was the most productive 
member of his group, and 2) an inference can be made that Alli­
ance was afraid that if it had fired another member of the group it 
would have faced a Title VII suit.252 
There are a number of troubling aspects with the Tappe II 
court's conclusions-conclusions which seem to follow implicitly 
from Justice Rehnquist's reading of Title VII. One problem with 
the test as transformed by the court is that it fails to satisfy the 
essential function of the test itself, which is to "raise[ ] an inference 
of discrimination because [of employment actions that], if otherwise 
unexplained, are more likely than not based on consideration of im­
permissible factors," (i.e., race, sex, religion or national origin).253 
251. See, e.g., id. at 253-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Our task in this case, like 
any other case involving the construction of a statute, is to give effect to the intent of 
Congress. To divine that intent, we traditionally look first to the words of the 
statute ...."). 
252. Tappe v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 198 F. Supp. 2d 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
253. Tappe v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 177 F. Supp. 2d 176, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981». 
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Unless one believes, as Part IV of this Note shows is not true, that 
discrimination and the effects of discrimination are things of the 
past, then the version of the McDonnell Douglas test created by the 
Tappe II court simply fails to eliminate other reasonable hypotheses 
for Tappe's termination. Perhaps Tappe was paid more than the 
other managers, and thus firing him made sense financially for his 
employer. Perhaps Tappe's "profile" didn't fit with the business 
model going forward because his style, his experience, his qualifica­
tions, did not fit in with that plan. Perhaps Tappe was simply the 
least personable of the group and was fired for that reason. There 
are a number of possibilities which might explain why Wayne Tappe 
was let go. Of course, when a black employee is fired it is possible 
that one or more of these non-discriminatory reasons played a part. 
However, this awareness only serves to highlight a fundamental dif­
ference between Tappe and a similarly-situated, black employee. 
While non-discriminatory possibilities exist for both terminations, 
Tappe is not part of a class against whom such justifications have 
historically been used to conceal invidious discrimination. The Mc­
Donnell Douglas test operates to shift the benefit of the doubt (or 
the burden of proof).254 In the case of the black employee, it makes 
sense to require the employer to justify his decision when there is 
the possibility of racist discrimination. In the case of a white male 
like Tappe, it makes no sense at all to require the employer to ex­
plain his decision as based upon non-prohibited criteria. Instead, 
the history of the statute and the purpose behind the McDonnell 
Douglas test both suggest that because racism is such an unlikely 
cause of his firing, the burden should be on Tappe to prove that he 
was in fact fired because of invidious discrimination. 
Another problem with the holding in Tappe II, and with Justice 
Rehnquist's reading of Title VII, is that it is no longer sufficient for 
the black applicant or employee to be qualified for the job that he 
or she has been hired for. The Tappe II reading would prevent em­
ployers from hiring or promoting members of minority groups un­
less the employer can show that the prospective or current 
employee is at least as qualified, if not more qualified, than a white 
counterpart. After all, the Tappe II court reasoned that employers 
who use permissible criteria in making employment decisions gen­
erally do not fire their most productive workers.255 As workplaces 
become more diverse, whenever any worker is fired perhaps he will 
254. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). 
255. See Tappe II., 198 F. Supp. at 376. 
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have a claim under Title VII. All he need show is that someone of 
a different race did not perform as well,256 this despite the fact that 
"there is rarely a single, best qualified person for a job. "257 Em­
ployers who attempt to bring diversity into the workplace will be 
subject to lawsuits under the very statute designed to bring diversity 
into the workplace.258 The very idea that a member of a minority 
group might attempt to use Title VII to vindicate his rights creates a 
cause of action under Title VII for white employees. Title VII, an 
anti-discrimination statute, may thus become a statute used to har­
ass employers and constrict their legitimate business decisions. 
Here, the central problem of the Tappe II decision and Justice 
Rehnquist's reading of Title VII is revealed. Imagine that a black 
lawyer in 1965 is hired into a formerly segregated law firm in the 
South. Let's assume that he is qualified for the position, but only 
minimally, because, of course, he's had few opportunities to prac­
tice his profession. Now imagine a white lawyer who also applied 
for the position and didn't receive it, even though he is in many 
ways more qualified because he has more experience than the black 
lawyer who was hired. According to Tappe II, and according to 
Justice Rehnquist's reading of Title VII, the white applicant would 
have a prima facie case under Title VII because "employers moti­
vated by profit or other legitimate reasons do not" fail to hire the 
"best qualified" applicant.259 Now imagine the white lawyer is 
hired, and the black lawyer is not. The black lawyer would not be 
able to make out a prima facie case because, after all, the white 
applicant was best qualified under the only allowable criteria. Em­
ployers, under these circumstances, would be foolish to hire anyone 
but the most qualified for any job, because to do otherwise would 
subject them to liability. This reading of Title VII surely under­
mines the purposes of the statute since it would simply freeze the 
employment situation of 1965 just as it was. This cannot logically 
be what Congress intended, and when the legislative history is ex­
amined, there is no doubt that this is not what Congress intended. 
Justice Rehnquist's reading of Title VII, that Congress wanted to 
"prohibit[] a covered employer from considering race when mak­
256. See, e.g., Collins v. Sch. Dist., 727 F.Supp. 1318 (1990). 
257. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641 n.17 (1987) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
258. But see id. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The logic of antidiscrimination 
legislation requires that judicial constructions of Title VII leave 'breathing room' for 
employer initiatives to benefit members of minority groups."). 
259. Tappe /I, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
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ing an employment decision,"26o is simply nonsensical. 
IX. 	 UNEQUAL PROTECTION: HONORING THE PURPOSE OF 
TITLE VII 
The problem then is that the Tappe II court's interpretation of 
the McDonnell Douglas test precludes any consideration of race or 
other protected classification from being used to make a legitimate 
business decision, however banal or benign that consideration may 
be. The use of the McDonnell Dougias test in this way makes pri­
vate diversity efforts illegal per se. Voluntary, informal efforts by 
an employer to diversify a traditionally segregated workplace-a 
workplace like the upper echelons of a financial services company, 
or the partnership of a major law firm-would too often be illegal 
under Title VII. 
As this Note has endeavored to show, this is not what Title VII 
was supposed to do: in Johnson, a concurring Justice Stevens 
opined that "Congress [in enacting Title VII] intended that tradi­
tional management prerogatives be left undisturbed to the greatest 
extent possible. "261 In addition, Congress had made clear that one 
of the purposes of Title VII was to encourage private voluntary ef­
forts to improve the racial situation in the United States.262 The 
McDonnell Douglas test was not designed as a method for investi­
gating the legitimate private employment choices of businesses.263 
At least one United States Court of Appeals has explicitly held 
that the McDonnell Douglas formulation was simply not created to 
protect whites at all.264 "Racial discrimination against whites is for­
bidden, it is true, but no presumption of discrimination can be 
based on the mere fact that a white is passed over in favor of a 
black."265 Why not? If Title VII is intended to protect both whites 
and blacks equally, then why shouldn't whites be able to make out a 
presumption of discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas 
prima facie test under the same standards as a member of a pro­
tected class? 
The answer, as revealed in the legislative history detailed 
above, and the socio-historical context which led to the enactment 
260. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 220 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
261. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 645 	(Stevens, J., concurring). 
262. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 2393 (1964). 
263. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 207. 
264. Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 1986). 
265. [d. 
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of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, is that Title VII was never intended to 
protect white males at all. After McDonald, Johnson and Weber, 
there is a strong argument to be made that while Title VII protects 
all persons from invidious employment discrimination, it does not 
and should not protect all persons equally.266 And while the osten­
sibly neutral language of the statute protects white males, it cannot 
be suggested, in light of the historical context in which Title VII was 
passed, and as elucidated by its legislative history, that Title VII, or 
any section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was implemented to pro­
tect anyone other than racial minorities, particularly African 
Americans.267 
As Justice Stevens wrote in his Johnson concurrence, "neither 
the 'same standards' language used in McDonald, nor the 'color 
blind' rhetoric used by the Senators and Congressmen who enacted 
the bill, is now controlling."268 The Court has recognized, at least in 
part, that under Title VII not all forms of racial discrimination are 
the same. Affirmative action plans, the Court has said, must be le­
gal in order to further the fundamental purpose of TItle VII. In 
addition, the Court has stated several times that because Title VII 
was passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause and not the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendment there is no equal protection requirement 
inherent in the law.269 The court in Tappe II implicitly ignored this 
finding, just as it ignored Weber and Johnson, by requiring that all 
plaintiffs have their cases viewed under the same standard. By do­
ing so, the Tappe II court imported an equal protection standard 
into Title VII that the Supreme Court had explicitly said was not 
there. This part of the Tappe II decision appears to be unprece­
dented. There appears to be no case in which a federal court has 
applied strict scrutiny to a court-made presumption, and then found 
that the presumption, created by the court, must be applied equally 
or the underlying statute will be unconstitutional. 
Strict scrutiny, it should be remembered, was initially sug­
gested by the Court to protect the interests of "discrete and insular 
266. See id. 
267. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 646 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
("[T]he statute does not absolutely prohibit preferential hiring in favor of minorities; it 
was merely intended to protect historically disadvantaged groups against 
discrimination ...."). 
268. [d. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
269. [d. at 628 n.6 ("Title VII ... was enacted pursuant to the commerce power to 
regulate purely private decisionmaking and was not intended to incorporate and partic­
ularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.") (quoting United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 n.6 (1979». 
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minorities."27o In early strict scrutiny cases, the Court was con­
cerned with such things as "legal restrictions which curtail the civil 
rights of a single racial group."271 Prior to 1989, the Supreme Court 
had recognized that racially benign government actions were differ­
ent than those which harmed or isolated specific minority groups: 
"Government may take race into account when it acts not to de­
mean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast 
on minorities by past racial prejudice ...."272 
But that recognition changed with Richmond v. 1.A. Croson,273 
when the Court for the first time applied strict scrutiny to a govern­
ment sponsored affirmative action program. As Justice Marshall, 
the author of McDonald, said in his Croson dissent: "A profound 
difference separates governmental actions that themselves are ra­
cist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of 
prior racism ...."274 Justice Marshall went on to point out that the 
only possible justification for the sudden change was the apparent 
belief on the part of the majority that "racial discrimination [was] 
largely a phenomenon of the past ...."275 Justice Marshall was 
justified in his belief that America was nowhere near "eradicating 
racial discrimination or its vestiges."276 
Strict scrutiny is applied to governmental actions only. Be­
cause it cannot be used to investigate private employment, there 
was no basis for the Tappe II court to use strict scrutiny to investi­
gate the private program at issue. The Tappe II court's duty was to 
interpret the law that Congress had passed, using the standards 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonald and Weber and 
other Title VII cases. There is no indication from any of these cases 
that courts must examine every Title VII claimant under precisely 
the same standards. In fact, the Court has noted on numerous occa­
sions that the McDonnell Douglas test is not a rigid formula to be 
applied the same way to every case-rather it is a flexible test de­
signed to root out discriminatory actions that, on their face, may 
appear unrelated to race.277 
There have been other attempts to get around the McDonnell 
270. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
271. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
272. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325 (1978) (Bren­
nan, J., concurring). 
273. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
274. Id. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
275. Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
276. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
277. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
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Douglas problem. One solution was formulated in Parker v. The 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad CO.278 Karl Parker, an employee of the 
B & 0 Railroad, had for several years tried unsuccessfully to get a 
promotion from conductor to fireman. He charged "essentially that 
affirmative action constituted unlawful reverse discrimination. "279 
In response, B & 0 Railroad acknowledged it had "engaged in af­
firmative action ... [in order] to overcome the underutilization of 
minorities and women in various jobs" during part of the time 
Parker alleged he had suffered an adverse employment decision.280 
Therefore, the Court was confronted with a direct challenge to an 
"employer's efforts to improve the record of [its] hiring prac­
tices"281 by a white employee who felt his rights under Title VII had 
been violated. The Court, however, found the facts as presented 
insufficient to determine whether B & 0 Railroad's plan was valid 
under the Weber criteria.282 
At least one of the adverse employment decisions Parker 
claimed to have suffered came after B & O's affirmative action plan 
had expired.283 For this part of the complaint, the court looked to 
see whether Parker had, or could establish, a prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas.284 In addressing the McDonnell Douglas test, 
the court pointed out that the test was simply a "procedural embod­
iment of the recognition that our nation has not yet freed itself from 
the legacy of hostile discrimination."285 The court then discussed 
how the McDonnell Douglas test must be adjusted to reflect vari­
ous circumstances brought by plaintiffs.286 
In order to account for the different circumstances of different 
plaintiffs, the court enunciated what has come to be called "the 
background circumstances test." The background circumstances 
test is a modification of the first prong of McDonnell Douglas 
278. 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
279. Id. at 1013. 
280. Id. at 1015. 
281. Id. at 1013. 
282. Id. at 1016. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 1016-17 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973». 
285. Id. at 1017. It is interesting to note the use of the term "hostile" to clarify 
the word discrimination. It seems that the Parker court recognized that there are differ­
ent kinds of discrimination, and that different kinds of discrimination need to be treated 
differently by the law. 
286. Id. (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981». In Bundy, the 
court changed the fourth element of the McDonnell Doug/as test to reflect the particu­
lar employment decision of the case. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 951. 
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which, in its original incarnation, required the plaintiff to be a racial 
minority.287 Obviously the first prong as enunciated could not ap­
ply to a white plaintiff, and, as the court says, "it defies common 
sense to suggest that the promotion of a black employee justifies an 
inference of prejudice against white co-workers in our present soci­
ety."288 So the court found that for a majority plaintiff to establish 
the first prong of McDonnell Douglas in order to allow a "fact 
finder to infer discriminatory motive" the white plaintiff must show 
"intentionally disparate treatment when background circumstances 
support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer 
who discriminates against the majority."289 
The solution in Parker has much to recommend it. The back­
ground circumstances test avoids the problem, exemplified by 
Tappe II, of courts inserting themselves too far into private em­
ployer's employment decisions. Instead of requiring that the em­
ployer hire the "best" employee, based on some strict, objective 
model, the court in Parker keeps the burden of establishing a prima 
facie case back where it belongs, on the employee, by requiring the 
plaintiff to demonstrate the likelihood of intentional discrimination 
on the part of the employer. Given the lack of significant anti­
white discrimination in the workforce, the Parker test offers one 
rational solution to the McDonald/Weber problem. 
The Parker test, however, is itself unsatisfactory in a number of 
ways. For one, it still takes charges of racist employment discrimi­
nation against whites too seriously. It is the rare discrimination 
case brought under Title VII where the plaintiff is a white man al­
leging that he suffered an adverse employment decision because he 
was white and his employer held a racial animus against white peo­
ple.290 In these instances, the Parker test may be appropriate. 
However, the great majority of reverse discrimination cases argue 
that the white employee was fired because the other employees 
287. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017 (see McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802 (1973». 
288. [d. 
289. See id. at 1017 n.9 ("We do not equate lawful affirmative action with discrim­
ination against the majority, nor do we suggest that [such a] program would ... consti­
tute suspicious circumstances sufficient to justify an inference of discriminatory intent 
under McDonnell Douglas."). 
290. See, e.g., Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir. 2002); 
Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2002); Ditzel v. Univ. of Med. and Den­
tistry of New Jersey, 962 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.J. 1997); DeCapua v. Bell-Atlantic, New 
Jersey, 313 N.J.Super. 110 (1998). 
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were persons of a protected class.291 In these cases, the plaintiff is 
using Title VII as a sword to attack the very diversity Title VII was 
designed to encourage. Courts should simply refuse to recognize 
such claims as allowing for recovery, and instead should look at 
such situations as examples of Title VII working as it was designed. 
Courts should return to the clear and unmistakable wording of the 
first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test; if the plaintiff is not a 
member of a protected class, i.e., a racial minority or a woman, then 
the McDonnell Douglas test is an inappropriate method of estab­
lishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination, and the 
plaintiff should not be allowed to avail himself of it. If he wants to 
prove racial discrimination he will have to overcome the strong pre­
sumption the facts of our society rationally suggest-that racism 
against whites is a non-issue. 
CONCLUSION 
In a sense, Title VII creates a floor below which the employer 
may not go. It does not prevent him from hiring and firing who he 
wishes. Rather it imposes on him a certain burden to justify an ad­
verse employment decision in the case of a minority precisely be­
cause the possibility of the decision being based on a racist or other 
discriminatory reason is, based on our nation's history, such a viable 
and unacceptable possibility. When he makes an employment deci­
sion that works against a white person, this suspicion does not exist, 
and the necessity of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test is ob­
viated. In this way, Title VII can be thought of as a mild form of 
government sponsored affirmative action. 
Formal affirmative action plans have been one way that busi­
nesses have worked to diversify their workplaces.292 At the same 
time, private, informal efforts at diversity are recognized by many 
business leaders as essential to keeping their businesses viable into 
the 21st century.293 Diversity efforts, whether formal or informal, 
are both forward looking and progressive. In part they are retro­
spective efforts to remedy the prior wrong of segregation-to use 
an analogy from tort law, affirmative action may be necessary until 
291. A Westlaw search-"reverse discrimination" & "hostile work environment" 
& "white male" & "Title VII "-reveals forty-seven cases in the database. A similar 
search excluding the "hostile work environment" phrase increases the number to 472. 
292. Eskridge, supra note 176, at 1494. 
293. See Brief of Amicus Curiae 65 Leading Businesses in Support of Respon­
dents, at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516) (arguing that a di­
verse workforce is "important to amici's continued success in the global marketplace"). 
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black Americans, and other traditionally and currently oppressed 
minorities, are made whole: that is, put in the position they would 
have been in had they come to America as equal partners with 
whites.294 At the same time, diversity itself is necessary to a healthy 
workplace in our increasingly diverse society.295 A business with an 
all white face is less likely to draw customers from a rainbow of 
potential consumers. 
When the day comes when all traces of past discrimination are 
gone, any act of discrimination against any person based on race 
will be execrable, and should be subject to society's condemnation. 
When that day comes, Title VII should be read as equally protect­
ing all persons from invidious discrimination. But that day is not 
yet here, and until it is, justice requires, and the law should allow, 
employers to make value judgments between types of discrimina­
tion to favor of those who traditionally have been discriminated 
against, even when that favoritism may thwart the interests of those 
who have traditionally enjoyed the fruits of discrimination. One 
way to achieve this goal is to recognize that some forms of racial 
discrimination are different than others and ought to be treated as 
such. To deny this fact, to pretend that all forms of discrimination 
are the same, only slows the arrival of the day when racial discrimi­
nation finally vanishes from the American landscape. 
A reading of Title VII which does not allow this to happen-in 
other words, the Tappe II court's reading-will simply ensure that 
the ultimate statutory purpose of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the par­
tial remediation of 350 years of overt, government sanctioned ra­
cism, will never come about. This, as the Weber Court said, would 
be ironic indeed.296 More, it would be another missed opportunity 
for the nation to live up to the ideals of our founding: to give all 
persons an equal stake in American life and American liberty, to 
give every American a fair shot not only at pursuing happiness, but 
of attaining it,297 
Michael 1. Fellows 
294. Part of this argument, of course, might mean that other minorities also 
should not benefit equally from the protections of Title VII. Asian Americans, for ex­
ample, have a higher per capita income than do white Americans. On the other hand, a 
strong argument can be made that American Indians have suffered just as much, if not 
more from hostile discrimination at the hands of white America, and so would also be 
entitled to full Title VII protections. 
295. See supra note 293. 
296. United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,208 (1979). 
297. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
